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Alexander on form-in-matter and the breakdown o f Aristotle’s categories
One aspect of the story of the destruction of Aristotle’s categories in late antiquity has already been told, 
lichard Sorabji has shown us how Philoponus, in the contra Proclum, came to consider prime matter as ‘the 
hree-dimensional’, which he also called a substantial quantity.1 This view had the effect of raising a quantity, 
he three-dimensional, to the level of substance. There is another part to this story, one which fills in the picture, 
it shows us how Philoponus’ view in the contra Proclum depends upon a by then long standing tradition. For 
Philoponus argues for the notion of a substantial quantity by referring to the already accepted idea that there are 
substantial qualities.2 It is the history, or at any rate a certain portion of the history', of the idea of substantial 
qualities that I ’d like to tell here.
First I had better be clearer about what I mean by the “breakdown” of Aristotle’s categories. There were of 
:ourse attempts to reduce the number of the nine non-substance categories—ultimately, it was suggested by 
some, down to just one, the category of relation— , but this sort of reduction would not amount to a breakdown 
of the categories in the sense I mean here. By far the most important feature of Aristotle’s categorical structure 
is the distinction between substances and non-substances, or accidents, and any attempt to blur that distinction 
would be an attempt to “destroy” or “breakdown” the categories in my sense. One way to do so would be to 
raise an accident to the level of substance—as Philoponus did with his substantial quantity, the ‘three- 
dimensional’, or as some maintained, as we shall see, that there are qualities which are ‘substantial’, e.g., 
whiteness in the-case of snow.3 Another would.be to demote substances to one of the non-substance categories. 
There were a variety of suggestions along this line in antiquity as well: from the relatively easily handled one 
that Socrates is an accident of place to the more serious tack that form is an accident of matter, or that sensible 
substance is really nothing but a bundle of accidents.
The two strategies of attack are closely related in that they both issue from discussions and criticisms of 
Aristotle’s “definition” of “being in a subject” at Categories la24-5. Aristotle himself says that specific 
differences are not in a subject (3a21f.). Once one comes to see specific differences as special sorts of qualities. 
then one opens the door to there being other qualities, or properties generally, that deserve this special status. 
The form-in-matter problem also arises out of discussions concerning Categories la24-5. Suppose one asks 
whether form is related to matter as in a subject Why not? It is not a part of matter nor can it exist separately. 
Besides, Aristotle himself speaks of form as being predicated o f  matter, both in contexts where “predicated o f ' 
seems to be equivalent, in our sense, to “accident of”—we will consider some examples shortly.
In his discussions of the form-in-matter problem, I believe Alexander is able to clarify the Aristotelian view, 
bui not without a price: for what we shall find is that his solution supports the arguments of those who. like 
Lucius, would want to wreck Aristotle's categories. In fact, Alexander’s solution to the form-in-matter problem 
rules out Porphyry’s reply, on Aristotle’s behalf, to Lucius.
My discussion will be divided into six sections. In the first I provide some background to the form-in-matter 
problem in Aristotle; the second focusses on Alexander’s solution to the problem; in the third, we consider 
Plotinus’ contribution: in the fourth, there’s brief treatment of the problem by the commentators on the 
Categories; and finally in the fifth section. I look at what I shall be calling “Lucius’ problem”—this pertains 
directly to the substantial qualities doctrine, and it reveals. I will be suggesting, how Alexander's way of solving 
the form-in-matter problem contributes to the breakdown of the Aristotelian categories. In the sixth section I 
shall suggest how the two issues are connected.
A. Aristotelian background
Let us begin with the “Aristotelian” sources of the form-in-matter problem. Here I shall ask the reader to do 
two things which from our modem perspective are unusual. The first is to consider Categories la24-5 as a 
definition, or quasi-definition, of an accident. It was viewed along these lines in the texts we will be discussing: 
some of the commentators even made explicit how Aristotle's description could be seen as analogous to a 
definition.4 Consider the text:
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i) the predicate belongs in the definition of of the subject (as animal belongs to man), or
ii) the subject belongs in the definition of the predicate (as in Ar.’s favorite example, snubness belongs
to nose).
So. there is κατά συμβεβηκός, or per accidens, predication just in case neither the predicate belongs in the 
definition of the subject nor vice-versa (e.g., white belongs to man κατά συμβεβηκός). Accidental predication 
is a case of one thing being said o f another, per se predication, in either sense, is not, so if form is predicated of 
maiter in one of the 2 senses of per se predication, then they are not other in being. Aristotle’s “somehow one” 
could be explicated along these lines, and artifacts would not make up a unity, since the shape the artists 
imposes on die bronze is not related to it per se. Physics 2.1, with its distinction between natural substances and 
artifacts in terms of having an internal vs. an external principle of change can be read in this light.
One who adopts the dynamic strategy, as L.A. Kosman (1984 & 1987) does, will point out that the change 
from potency to act is not one of becoming other than, or alteration, but a realization of an already latent 
tendency, or a realization of what that something already is. For example, an infant’s becoming a mature adult is 
not a case of alteration, but an actualization of the human form which was already there—potentially. According 
to the dynamic strategy, the form and matter are somehow one because the matter is potentially the form; and at 
the moment of actualization they are one. Again, artifacts fail to be unities on the dynamic strategy as well, 
because the shape of the statue i$ not latent in the bronze as such, but must be imposed on it by the artist. Again, 
Physics 2.1 is relevant here.
Both strategies may be brought to bear on these problems.7 The unity of form and matter in the case of 
natural substances is what distinguishes them from artifacts and accidental beings, like white man. So form’s 
being predicated of matter is not a case of one thing being said of another. We could also put this by saying that 
matter is not sufficiently distinct from form to be a subject for accidental predication. Matter underlies, or 
serves as a υποκείμενον for, form in a different way. Aristotle formulates the different ways of underlying at 
Metaphysics 9.7 1049a27-b2:8
For the subject (τό καθ' oC) or substratum (τό υποκείμενον) differ by being or not being a ‘this’ (τόδε 
τι ): the substratum (τό υποκείμενον) of accidents is an individual such as a man. i.e. body and soul, 
while the accident is something like musical or white. The subject is called, when music is implanted in 
it, not music but musical, and the man is not whiteness but white, and not ambulation or movement but 
walking or moving.—as in the above examples of ‘o f  something [e.g. a casket is not wood but of 
wood]. Wherever this is so, then, the ultimate (τό έσχατον) subject is a substance: but when this is not 
so but the predicate is a form or a ’this’ (είδος τι καί τόδε τι), the ultimate subject (τό έσχατον) is 
maner and material substance. And it is only right that the O f  something locution (έκείνινον) be used 
with reference both to the matter and to the accidents; for both are indeterminates. (Oxford translation, 
slightly revised9)
The passage sets up a parallel between the way a composite substance (man considered as a composite of body 
and soul) relates to accidents and matter relates to form, but it does so in order to indicate the difference in the 
way each underlies. The composite substance is already a ‘this’, and so it underlies accidents as something 
already determinate, where its being so is not dependent on the accidents which modify i t  The matter, by 
contrast, is not already a ‘this’, but requires form in order to gain determinateness. Thus, although composite 
substance and matter both underlie, or can be considered υποκείμενα, their ‘being or not being a “this”’ affects 
the way in which they serve as υποκείμενα. This difference underpins the linguistic parallel10 between matter 
and accidents, for since matter is not a ‘this’, it can appear to be a modification of an already definite form, just 
as an accident is a modification of an already definite substance. Aristotle points out that the parallel is reflected 
in Greek language, since the ‘o f  locution (έκείνινον) is used for both matter and accidents. That is, we don’t 
call the statue bronze, but of bronze, just as we don’t call someone music, but musical. Both are indeterminates 
when the respective ‘predication’ has occurred, and must be so, if the substance in question is one substance, or 
a unity.
Let this suffice as an outline of Aristotle’s position regarding the form-matter problem. To sum up, I hope to 
have shown that
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For soul does not come to be in body without qualification, since if that were so it would have come to 
be in every body, hence also in the simple bodies, fire, air, w at», earth, and that’s impossible. But the 
organic body is subject and matter for soul, which is neither able to be organic before it has soul nor, 
once it throws off the soul, can it still be organic. For no soulless body is organic. Therefore, on that 
account, it is not possible to grasp [that] in which soul is. For being organic [goes] with soul, as lead 
[goes] with heaviness.
Now it might seem that a natural form, like soul, is in something determinate, viz., a body, and so why isn’t it in 
that as a subject? So, at any rate, would go the objection that Alexander seems to be anticipating;15 But 
Alexander argues that the ex quo matter for soul is a “soulless body”, while its constitutive matter is an “organic 
body”. Alexander’s rather abstract and technical language helps make the point clearly, that there can be no 
question of soul being in a soulless body, so there can also be no question of the soulless body somehow 
remaining intact through the change; if it could do so, of course, then thé soul would have to be conceived of as 
an accidental modification of i t  As Alexander says, “what has something [in it as] in a subject has this while 
maintaining its own substance”.16 On the other hand, the soul is in the organic body, b u t again, there can be no 
question of the organic body persisting through the change. It comes to be and perishes with the soul. We put 
this above in terms of form and matter not being other in being; so here, the soul and an organic body are not 
other in being, i.e., in die sense evidendy intended here, at any rate, the organic body is not specifiable 
independendy of soul: an organic body is defined by soul, just as lead is defined by heaviness. This is sense (i) 
of per se predication we distinguished above.
There are other ways in which Alexander expresses die idea that form and matter are “not other in being”— 
e.g., in terms of their codependence on one another, since neither can form exist independendy of matter {Manx. 
5 121,32-4; Quaest. 1.17 30,4-6), or in terms of matter being included in the account of form. i.e., sense (ii) of 
per se predication {Quaest. I.26>—but the dependence of matter on form is the most important for the purpose 
of solving the form-in-matter problem. For what this shows is really the crucial feature of Alexander’s solution: 
any subject of an inherent property must have certain credentials, viz., it must already exist in actuality, and so 
be capable of existing separately from that inherent, and of being specified independendy of it. What we saw 
above in Aristode as a description of two ways of underlying, where the subject for inherent properties was said 
to be a τάδε τι, is turned into a requirement in Alexander: a subject must already be a τόδε τι if it is to underlie 
an accident. For convenience, let’s call this requirement the τόδε τι requirement:
The τόδε τι requirement: if x  is a subject for an inherent property y. then x  is a τόδε τι before y comes to be in 
it.
Of course, we must bear in mind that if something is a τόδε τι then it exists in actuality and is capable of 
existing independently.
I hope by now to have shown that Alexander’s discussion of the form-matter problem includes those 
features that we saw in our outline of Aristotle's position above, viz., an emphasis on the differences between 
artifacts and composite substances, the use of the idea that form and matter are not other in being, and a 
formulation of two senses of υποκείμενόν. But before we can move on to discuss later treatments of the 
problem, we must consider another treatment by Alexander himself. For in Quaest. 1.8 he introduces a 
restriction on the discussion that proved to be influential, and also makes use of a distinction, perhaps invented 
by Lucius, that will be of some importance to our own discussion shortly. .
Quaest. 1.8 begins with a reference to the Mantissa discussion we have been considering.17 It builds on that 
discussion, and adds to it in important ways. I don’t go into the details of this comparison here, but restrict my 
comments just to the new b it I have divided tlje following portion of 1.8 for convenience (17,8-18,30).
(1) To [show] that form is not in matter as in a substrate, it was said that soul is not in body either, since 
the form is the cause for the matter’s being in actuality (for it is not possible for it to be in [real] 
existence apart from the form), and that what is in a substrate is in something which is in actuality and is 
able to exist even apart from what is in it as in a substrate.
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Alexander’s response to this objection can be summed up in a general way as follows. He first makes some 
general remarks about how we ought to conduct our inquiry into such matters (3). We want to know whether x  
is in y as in a subject Alexander suggests that in order even to start the inquiry, we must be able to take some x  
in which y is and then ask how y  is in i t  But this requires that we can identify x  independently of y. In other 
words, he first insists, once again, on die τόδε τι requirement that any subject for an inherent property must 
already exist in actuality arid be a τόδε τι. He draws the following corollary to this (T*),
Well, the form is not yet in the matter, if [the matter] is taken by itself; and for this reason one would not 
enquire how that is in it which is not even in it in the first place.
So there can be no question of form being in matter as in a subject. What form is in is the “compound being”— 
or the composite of matter and form. But if we consider how form is in that, we must see that it is not as in a 
subject, since the form is in the composite as a part, and so the condition as set forth in clause (a) of the quasi­
definition of inherence is not satisfied. The conclusion of course is that form is not in anything as in a subject, 
and hence notan accident of anything.
There is still a question, raised by this objection and again, by a second objection at (6), of how to 
distinguish the way that form contributes to its subject, viz. the composite, from the way an accident contributes 
to its subject. Both would seem to be necessary conditions, in some sense, o f  their subject’s existence. It is in 
this context that Alexander sets out two ways of contributing to the being of something in (7), (a) & (b), and it is 
this distinction that will be most important for what follows. It is a distinction between being an unqualified 
condition for the being of something and being á condition as a part for the being of something. Call this latter a 
constituent condition.] 8 Form is a constituent condition of the composite: it contributes to the being of the 
composite as a part of what it is. Such being the case, it obviously follows that the composite cannot exist 
without the form—the form helps to make up its very being; as Alexander puts it, the form contributes to the 
composite’s being a τόδε τ ι. An accident, on the other hand, inheres in a subject which is already complete, 
which is already a τόδε τι. As such, the composite can exist without the inherent property. It may. therefore, at 
first glance, strike one as odd to speak of inherent properties as being conditions, of any sort, for the subject’s 
“being in existence” (τό είναι έν ύττοστάσει). But what such locutions mean here is only that inherent 
properties contribute to the subject’s being qualified in some way, either in terms of quality, or quantity, or any 
of the other nine, non-substance categories, and not to the subject’s actual existence. The subject for an inherent 
property, which on Alexander’s view must be the composite, and not the matter, already exists independently of 
it. Of course, there is a sense in which composites depend upon inherent properties for their very existence, but 
this is only at the general level—a piece of wax must have some shape or other, but it can exist without the 
particular shape it now has. So Alexander argues in the passage immediately following (8).19
Before we move on to other discussions of the form-in-matter problem, it will be useful to sum up the key
features of Alexander’s solution.
(T) τόδε τι requirement: if x  is a subject for an inherent property y. then x is  a τόδε τι beforey  comes to be in
it.
(T*) corollary to (T): since matter has no actual existence apart from form, there can be no question of form 
being in matter in the first place.
(C) constituent condition: x is  a constituent condition of y =<jfJ is a part of the being ofy  (or contributes to y ’s 
being a τόδε τ ι, or completes the being of y).
(CP) constituent principle: if x is a constituent condition of y, then xcannot be in y as in a subject
As a final remark, note that Alexander's formulation of the constituent principle is quite general; it is not limited 
to forms, although it is brought in here in connection with the problem of form-in-matter. This leaves the door 
open to there being other examples, some of which we shall consider shortly.
1
«
*
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wo senses of subject, or ways of underlying; one as matter to form, the other as a subject for affections. The 
«her alternative is recognizable as Alexander’s—it is a version of the τόδε τι requirement: matter cannot be a 
lubject for form, since form is its actuality or perfection. Strictly speaking, form is not even in matter (our T* 
ibove), and here also Plotinus makes use of a version of the constituent principle; form, together with matter, 
complete some one thing. The third passage, on “not being in a substrate”, also emphasizes the constituent 
principle.
Plotinus is important to the rest of my story for two reasons; the first is obvious: his treatment of the form- 
in-matter problem was no doubt influential on the Neoplatonic commentators. But secondly, he makes use of all 
sf the key components of Alexander’s solution, (T), (T*), and (CP). The commentators, however, with the 
possible exception of Simplicius, omit (T) and its corollary (T*). Why?
We must remember, as I pointed out at the outset, that Plotinus ultimately drops the “division into 
elements”, since form, matter, and the composite make up a P-series, and so there can be no one genus, 
substance, to which they belong. But once the division is dropped, (T*) at any rate obviously goes with it, since 
it requires the-distinction between form and matter.21 Yet there is more. Plotinus’ final conception of sensible 
substance (chs. 8 & 15) amounts to a rejection of (T) as well. Let me explain.
In chapter 8 Plotinus suggests that we no longer consider the parts of which sensible substance is composed, 
but rather sensible substance as such, e.g„ stones, earth, plants, animals. It is still common to such substances 
that none of them are in a subject or belong to another, but there is a problem. Since we are considering sensible 
substances qua sensible, or as what is available to  the senses, they obviously cannot exist without some size or 
quality-—that would render them insensible. But if that is so, Plotinus asks, how are we “to separate off the 
accidental”, or distinguish the substantial from the accidental?
For when we separate off this, size, shape, colour, dryness, moistness, what are we going to establish as 
substance itself? For these [sensible] substances are qualified substances. But is there something around 
which occur what make being simply substance into being qualified substance? And will fire be not as a 
whole substance, but something belonging to it, like a pan? And what could this be? Just matter. But 
then, is sensible substance a conglomeration of qualities and matter...?22
I take it that even though Plotinus expresses the point interrogatively, it nonetheless is his final view on the 
nature of sensible substance. This would seem to be confirmed by his later remarks in ch. 15, where he speaks 
of sensible substances in the same way. The upshot of this view, and the important bit for our purposes, is how 
matter itself is allowed to underlie qualities and quantities, and so (T) is no longer in place. There is of course no 
question here of form being in matter, since we have dropped that division; but its substitute is a conglomeration 
of qualities + matter, and the qualities are “compounded together on” matter. In ch. 15 the metaphor is one of 
mixing; whether it is mixing or compounding the result seems to be the same: the matter in the bundle is 
capable of some sort of separate existence apart from the qualities. It helps but does not rid one of the difficulty 
to say, as Plotinus does at the end of the passage (6.3.8,35-7),
But here what underlies is sterile and inadequate to be being, because the others do not come from it. but 
it is a shadow, and upon what is itself a shadow, a picture and a seeming.
Yet even a shadowy existence is more than Alexander would have allowed matter on its own, at least if it is an 
actual shadowy existence—Alexander would of course allow that matter on its own has a potential existence. 
But 1 take it that Plotinus’ matter in the bundle is actual, albeit shadowy. If so, then his ultimate view of sensible 
substance implies that he would reject (T) as well.23
D. Neoplatonic commentators
Turning now to the Neoplatonic commentators, I suggest that it is not surprising, given Plotinus' treatment, 
to find Porphyry, his pupil, affirming without hesitation that form is in matter as in a subject (in Cat. 78.6-7). In 
response to a question as to which of the nine senses of “being in something” he has given capture the meaning
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something he now means as in a composite substance, to which “substance” and “what” may truly be
applied.
It is obvious that Elias agrees with Porphyry, since he baldly concedes that form «  an accident of matter.24 
He brings in the constituent principle when it’s a question of the composite. Ammonius and Olympiodorus give 
what I shall call a stipulative solution to the problem. They stipulate, instead of arguing, as Alexander did, that 
what Aristotle means when he says “in something” in the Categories is substance in the sense of composite 
substance. This reading may issue from the restriction of the application of the doctrine of the Categories to 
sensibles, since ultimately sensibles are composite substances in Aristotelian terms. But it has the effect of 
leaving the possibility open that there is another sense of subject which can underlie an inherent property. In 
other words, those who adopt the stipulative solution no longer adhere to thé τάδε τι requirement in general, 
nor, of course, its corollary (T*), because for them it would only hold in the context of the Categories, and this 
is just due to Aristotle’s restricted use of “subject” here to mean “composite substance”. Once they’ve made the 
stipulation, they make use of die constituent principle.
To see what I mean, consider the text of Ammonius. His response is twofold: he says that “the form, even if 
it is not part of the matter, is yet part of the composite”, and that, as such, die form is, in our terms, a constituent 
condition of the composite and so not in it as in a subject. But nothing here has ruled out form being in matter, 
since no appeal to the constituent principle can be made in that case, as Ammonius points out—“it is not part of 
the matter”. Olympiodorus’ solution is merely stipulative; he doesn’t even bother to mention the constituent 
principle. »
Simplicius calls for special treatment. For although he uses the stipulative solution as well (see (2)). his 
remarks in (la-b) come close to adhering to the τόδε τι requirement, but are opposed to (T*). Here's why: (la) 
does make the distinction between two ways of underlying—as a composite substance underlies accidents and 
as matter underlies form—and (lb) speaks of form giving being to matter; but nonetheless form is said to be in 
this form/esi matter. So although it may be arguable that Simplicius is adhering to (T) here, he certainly is not 
drawing the corollary, (T*).
Be that as it may, we will get clearer on this other conception of subject and how form can be an accident of 
it by looking at Porphyry apud Simplicium, and his solution to Lucius’ problem.
E. Lucius’ problem
Simplicius in Cat. 48.1-34
(1) Lucius and his followers also raise a difficulty about calling what is in a subject what is 'not as a 
part'. “For if we call the complements of the substance,” they say, “parts of it. and color, shape, and size 
complete the being of the sensible body in general and, in general, quality and quantity (for there could 
be no body without color and shape), while the being of this body, e.g.. snow, is completed by whiteness 
and coldness, it is necessary to make a choice: either not to say that these things are in a subject or that it 
is not right to assert that ‘what is not as a part’ is one of those things in a subject And how, generally, 
can complements be said [to be] in a subject? For Socrates’ shape is not in Socrates as in a subject but if 
anything, things which enter already completed things from outside would be in them as in a subject”
(2) In response to this problem Poiphyry said, “Subject is twofold, not only according to the Stoics, but 
also according to the earlier philosophers. For the quality-less matter, which Aristotle called in 
potentiality, is the first meaning of subject, and secondly, what subsists commonly or peculiarly 
qualified. For both the bronze and Socrates are subject for things which come to be in them or are 
predicated of them. Many of the things which come to be in,” he says, “are, relative to the first subject, 
in a subject, e.g., all color, all shape, and every quality is in the first matter as in a subject, not existing as 
a part of it and incapable of existing separately from i t  In the case of the second subject not all color nor 
all quality is in a subject but [they are] whenever they are not complements of the substance. At least 
white then, in the case of wool, is in a subject while in the case of snow it is not in a subject but 
completes the substance as a part and is rather a subject according to the substance. Likewise also heat is
1
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will falfft into account other ways Aristotle gets at that distinction, especially the central books of the 
Metaphysics, where he anyway rethinks and supplements the account in the Categories.
F. Final Remarks
In my final remarks I want to bring us back to Philoponus and the “three-dimensional”. I suggest, 
speculatively, that his view is an improvement on Porphyry’s. Suppose one is in the end more sympathetic to 
Porphyry’s account than Alexander’s, as Philoponus, it is probably safe to say, was. You will have to face a 
considerable difficulty in explaining how all qualities inhere in prime matter, and so are accidents of it. Take, 
e.g., the whiteness of a swan, which is an accident of the second subject, the swan, and the whiteness of snow, 
which is a substantial quality of the second subject, the snow. Now Porphyry would have us understand both 
these whites as being in prime matter as in a subject Both are colours, and as such, presumably, they require a 
substrate of a sufficient level of organization in order to be realized in it; minimally, I suppose, a surface. But 
we cannot allow that prime matter, as such, has a surface; to allow that would mean that it is already enformed 
in some way, in  other words, on a par with the second subjects.
Enter Philoponus, contra Proclum 425,6-14:
If, then, the three-dimensional is actually the substance of body as such, and it alone remains unchanged 
amidst the changes in bodies, as has been shown, then there is no argument to show that incorporeal 
matter must underlie it as its subject. It itself is the first subject underlying all natural forms, and further 
it is from it and from the substantial qualities in combination that there come into being bodies which are 
made real, that is, fire, water and so on. (trans. Sorabji 1988,29)
In other words, the first subject is not incorporeal matter, and so may be corporeal enough to underlie all 
accidents. Not, to be sure, corporeal enough to satisfy Alexander's τόδε τι requirement, but perhaps enough so 
to have a surface.
In an earlier work, Philoponus had put forward a position closer to Porphyry's, but still recognizable as 
being on the way to that of the contra Proclum.21 At in Cat. 65.8-66.5 the first subject is still prime matter, but 
the second subject is called at “qualityless body", and it is this that underlies all qualities, and they are said to 
accidentally inhere in i t  The structure of the solution is basically the same, in that, to use Philoponus* example, 
the heat in fire is completive of it, and so not an accident, while it does accidentally inhere in the qualityless 
body. Yet even so Philoponus’ conception of the qualityless body is different from Porphyry's qualityless 
matter, since he describes it as having volume in three dimensions (65.17-18). As such it will not be as difficult 
to conceive of how qualities might inhere in it.
John Ellis
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11 This clause is difficult, and my conjecture is that the τού έν φ  here is a  reference to Aristotle’s text just 
quoted, where του έν φ  also occurs at 1. 34. It makes good sense of the passage, since Alexander is 
obviously stressing the dependence of being a ‘this’ on form.
12ύττόστασις here evidently means actual or concrete existence. I take it that this is in opposition to potential 
existence, which matter has before form comes to be in it. I needn’t rely on the troublesome 11. 35-120,1 as 
evidence, but 120,8-9 makes the point that matter is not a subject in actuality. I will discuss this passage 
shortly; cf. also other occurrences of ύττόστασις in Alexander’s treatment of the FM problem with this 
sense, e.g. Quaest. 1.8 17,10.13.17-19; 18,6.11.12; 1.17 30,5; 1.26 42,16-17. For a brief discussion of the 
word and its various uses, see Lloyd 1981,52-3.
^Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
14cf. also 121,17-18 and Quaest. 1.26 42,11-14.
15cf. also 121,27-122,4.
16120,26-7 : το δέ έχον έν ύττοκειμένψ τι την οΐκείαν φυλάσσον ουσίαν έχει τούτο. Cf. 1.8 18,14: σώζον 
την οΐκείαν φύσιν.
17Specifically, to Maní. 5,119,21-122,15.
18Ι owe this way of putting the condition to Mario Mignucci.
l9Quaest. 1.8 18,30-5 (trans. Sharpies 1992): “Moreover, the subject differs from what is in it as in a subject, in 
that the subject is also able to exist without the things that are in it as in a subject (for even if the wax 
cannot exist ^ without a shape, it can at least exist apart from the shape which it now possesses), while that 
which is in a subject is not able to exist if that which is its subject is separated from it.”
206.3.7,12-20. All passages from Plotinus are translated by Armstrong 1987.
21Plotinus’ reason for rejecting the form, matter, composite division of course relies on it being a division of 
substance. He will no longer speak of form and matter as “elements” making up a substance, since he now, 
via the P-series argument, regards such a division as incoherent. The crucial point here is that he no longer 
uses the form-matter distinction, and that is why he cannot hold T*. Alexander, as Richard Sorabji has 
pointed out to me, also rejects the distinction of form and matter as a division o f substance, since he puts 
matter outside the categories altogether {in Metaph. 464.21-6. followed by Asclepius 380,31-5; cf. 
Theophrastus Metaph. 6.17). But nonetheless Alexander finds the distinction between form and matter 
useful for analyzing sensible substance, unlike Plotinus, and so he can hold T*. In other words, the principle 
does not require that the distinction between form and matter be one as between substances.
226.3.8,14-21.
^ I t  should be noted that Plotinus’ ultimate view, as he hints in this passage and puts more clearly in ch. 15. is 
that sensible substance is, ontologically speaking, on a par with artefacts. As long as the matter in the bundle 
is given an actual existence apart from the qualities, their union can never be complete—they will always 
remain accidental unities.
24For another example of Elias’ straightforwardness, see Ellis 1990,301-2.
^O f course one would still want to rale out hands and feet from being inherent properties of the subject, so the 
option would involve supplementing the clause. This, as I suggest below, is the option we ought to take.
26There is a parallel passage in Dexippus 23,25f.. although neither Porphyry nor Lucius are mentioned. Cf. also 
Elias 173,24-5, which expresses what I’m calling “Porphyry’s solution” in the context of criticizing 
Porphyry’s views, and Philoponus 65,8-66,5, on which see next note.
27For a fuller discussion of Philoponus’ various positions, see Sorabji 1988, ch. 2 .1 am again indebted to Franz 
de Haas for calling my attention to the passage discussed in this paragraph.
*An earlier version of this paper was read at the University of Texas at Austin Ancient Philosophy Workshop, 
Spring 1992, and I am grateful to many in the audience, especially Steve Strange and Christian Wildberg. 
I’d also like to thank David Sedley, Mario Mignucci and Richard Sorabji for their extremely helpful 
criticisms of earlier drafts.
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V
Alexander Mantissa 5.11931-120.17
(1) μήποτε οδν άλλος τις τρόττος του εν τινι παρά τό  έν ύποκειμένφ έοτίν ό του 
ώς είδος έν ϋλη. où γά ρ  οΤόν τε τό  είδος έν ϋλη ώς έν ύποκειμένφ είναι, ε" γε τό  έν 
υποκείμενη έστιν, δ έ'ν τινι μή ώς μέρος δν αδύνατον χωρίς είναι του έν ώ έστιν (δεΤ γά ρ  
τό  υποκείμενον τφ  έν υποκείμενη δντι τόδε τι είναι), ουδέν δε πρός^ τό  είναι ένεργείψ 
τόδε τι και του έν φ  λέγεται είναι χωρίς είδους, διό τούτο νουν ούδέ  ^ ή ϋλη αυτή καθ' 
αυτήν ύπόστασιν εχειν ούναται, δτι μηδέπω τό  είδος έστιν εν αυτή, έκαστον γά ρ  τω ν 
δντων μετά είδους εστί τόδε τι. κατά γαρ τό  είδος παν έστι τούτο δ λέγεται.
(2) ώστε ούκ δν είη έν ύποκειμένφ τή ϋλη τό  φυσικόν είδος, τό  μέν γά ρ  κατά 
τέχνην γινό μενον είδος έν ύποκειμένφ έστί τ φ  τόδε τι είναι καί είδος εχειν τό  ύπο 
κείμενον, ώς ό τεχνίτης τό  τεχνικόν είδος έμποιεί τε καί περιτίθησιν. où κέτι δέ τό  
φυσικόν είδος οΤόν τε ούτως είναι έν τή ϋλη λέγειν. où γάρ τόδε τι ούδέ ένεργείφ 
υποκείμενον ή υλη καθ' αυτήν, εΐ οδν τό μεν φυ σικόν είδος ούκ έν ύποκειμένφ, καί ή 
ψυχή δέ φυσικόν είδος, ούκ δν ούδέ ή ψυχή έν ύποκειμένφ είη.
* (3) ού γάρ έστιν ή ψυχή έν σώματι απλώς γινο μένη, έπεί καν έν παντί σώματι 
έγίυετο, ώστε καί έν τοΤς άπλοΐς, πυρί, άέρι, ΰδατι, γή· τούτο δέ αδύνατον, άλλ' έστιν 
υποκείμενον αύτφ  καί ‘υλη τό  όργανικόν σωρα, δ ούτε πρό του την ψυχήν έχειν οΤόν τε 
όργα νικόν είναι, οϋτε άποβαλόν τήν ψυχήν οργανικόν έτι. ούδεν γάρ δψυχον σώμα 
οργανικόν, ούκ αρα έστι λαβεΪν διό τούτο έν φ  έστιν ή ψυχή, συν γάρ  ταύτη δν 
οργανικόν, ώς ό μόλιβδος συν τή βαρύτητι.
Alexander Ouaestiones I.S. 17J?-18JO
(1) Πρός τό μή είναι τό  είδος έν τή υλη ώς έν ύποκειμένφ, μηδέ τήν ψυ^ήν έν τω  
σώματι ήν λεγόμενον, δτι πρός τό είναι τή ϋλη ένεργεία τό είδος αϊτιον (ού γαρ  οΤόν τε 
είναι αύτήν έν ύποστάσει χωρίς τού είδους), τό ο έν ύποκειμένφ δν έν τιν! έστιν 
ένεργείφ δντι δ δύναται είναι καί χωρίς του έν ύποκειμένφ αύτφ  δντος.
(2) πρός δ άντέπιπτεν τό καί τα σώματα βοηθείσθαι μέν πρός τό είναι έν ύποστάσει 
ύπό τών συμβεβηκότων, εϊ γε παν σώμα άνάγκη μετά σχήματος είναι τίνος καί 
χρώματος, όμολογεΐσθαι δέ ταΰτα έν ύποκειμένφ είναι τφ  σώματι. ούκ αυτάρκες οδν 
πρός τό μή είναι εν ύποκειμένφ τινϊ τό συντελειν τφ  ύποκειμένφ αύτφ  είς τό  είναι έν 
ύποστάσει.
(3) ή εί μέν τι άπλώς συντελεί τινι εις τό  είναι έν ύποστάσει, ού κεκώήυται τούτο έν 
ύποκειμένφ είναι αύτφ , ώς έδείχθη έπ! τοΰ σώματος καί τής ποιότητος, ής χωρίς 
αδύνατον είναι τι έν ύποστάσει σώμα- εί δέ τι είη ώς μέρος συντελούν τούτφ  έν φ  έστι, 
τούτο ούχ οΤόν τε έν ύποκειμένφ είναι τούτφ  οδ έστι μέρος, τό  δε είδος τούτφ  έν φ  
έστιν, ώς μέρος συντελούν φαίνεται.
(4) δεΐ μέν γάρ τήν ζήτησιν τού πότερον ώς έν ύποκειμένφ .τινί έστι τό προκείμενον 
ή μή ποιεΐσθαι λαβόντας τι πράγμα, έν φ  έστι μέν τούτο περί οδ ή ζήτησις, ζητείται δέ 
τό πώς έστιν έν αύτφ. ό γάρ δεικνύς δτι τό λευκόν έν σώματι ώς έν ύποκειμένφ, λαβών 
τι σώμα, έν φ  τό  λευκόν εστι, καί δείξος δν έν τ φ  σώματι αυτό μήτε ώς μέρος μήθ' ώς 
δυνάμενου χωρίς αυτού είναι έδειξεν, δτι έστιν έν ύποκειμένφ αύτφ. οΰτω δέ δεΐ καί τον 
ζητοΰντα περί τού είδους, πότερον έν ύποκειμένφ έοτίν ή μή, λαβεΐν τι τοιοδτο, έν φ  
έστι μεν ήδη τό είδος, ζητείται δε τό  πώς.
(5) έν μέν οδν τή ϋλη, εί καθ' αύτήν λαμβάνοιτο, οϋπω έστί τό είδος (διό ούδ' δν 
ζητοίτο, πώς έστιν έν αύτή τό  μηδέ τήν αρχήν δν έν αύτή), έπεί δέ έστιν έν τή 
συναμφοτέρερ ούσίφ τό  τοιουτον είδος, χρή τοιοϋτό τι προχείρισα μένους έπ' αύτοΰ τήν 
ζήτήσιν ποιεΐσθαι. άλλα μήν ήν δν λάβωμεν συναμφότερον ούσίαν, έν αύτή τό  είδος τό 
δν έν αύτή ώς μέρος έστί τού συναμφοτέρου. καί γάρ ή ψυχή έν τ φ  όργανικω σώματι, 
έν ώ έστιν, ούτως έοτίν ώς μέρος, εί δ' ώς μέρος, ούκ αν είη ώς έν ύποκειμένφ δν τούτφ , 
έν φ  έστιν οϋτως [έστιν], οϋθ' ή ψυ^ή οϋτε τι είδος δλως.
(6) ή έρεΐ τις καί τό  λευκόν του μέν λευκού σώματος είναι μέρος, έν ύποκειμένφ δ' 
είναι τω  σώματι φ  συντελεί πρός τό είναι έν ύποστάσει, διό καί τό  είδος τής μέν
λαβών, καί εστιν τό  έν ύποκειμένφ δωδέκατον τοΟ ϊν  τινι σημαινόμενον* πολλή γάρ  
διαφορά έστιν τού ώς έν ύποκειμένφ προς τό  ώς έν ΰλη. τό μ έν  γάρ έν ύποκειρένφ Ιν  
ούσία έοτίν και ώς έν ούσίρ συνθέτφ· σύνθετος δε έξ ύλης καί είδους ή γε φυσική ουσία· 
τό  δε έν υλη είδος ώς έν ανειδέφ καί μέρει ουσίας, καί τό  μέν έν ύποκειμένφ τό  είναι 
παρά του Υποκειμένου λαμβάνει, τό  δε είδος δίδωσιν τή ϋλη τό  εΤυαι* καί τό  μέν έν 
ύποκειμένφ ού συμ πληροί την τού συνθέτου ουσίαν, ώς δηλοΐ 6 ορισμός αύτοΰ, τό  δε έν 
ΐίλη συμπληροΐ. έτι δέ λέγω  οτι τό  μέν έν ύποκειμένφ συμβεβηκός έστιν καί ύπό μίαν τινά 
των έννέα κατηγοριών τελεί, τό  δέ είδος ύπό τήν ουσίαν άνάγεται καί τό  ύποκείμενον...
(2) εί δέ τις τό  έν τή Ολη είδος περιλαμβάνεσθαι νομίζοι τω  λόγφ , διότι καί τούτο 
έν τή Ολη έστιν ούχ ώς μέρος αύτης και άχώριστόν έστιν άπ' αυτής, εΤρηται πρότερον, 
δτι τό  Ιν τινι νΰν ώς έν συνθέτφ ουσίρ φησίν, έφ' ής καί ή ουσία καί το  τ ί έπαληθεύεΐν 
δύναται.
Simplidusin C a t48.1-34 % , .  , , ,
(0 ΑποροΟσι δέ οί περί τόν  Λούκιον καί τούτο προς τό  μη ώς μεροσ λεγεσθαι το  
έν ύποκειμένφ. "εί γά ρ  τα  συμπληρωτικά τής ούσίας, φασί, μέρη αυτής είναι λέγομεν, 
συμπληροΤ δε άπλώ ς μέν τού σώματος τού αισθητού τό  εΤναι ^ρώμα σχήμα μέγεθος καί 
απλώς ποιότης καί ποσότης (ífypouv γά ρ  καί άσχημάτιστον ουκ αν ε”η σώμα), τοΰδε δέ 
του σώματος οΐον χιόνος λευκοτης καί ψυχρότης, άνάγκη δυοΐν θάτερον, ή μη λέγειν 
ταυτα έν ύποκειμένφ ή μη καλώς άποφάσκεσθαι τώ ν έν ύποκειμένφ τό  μη ώς μέρη είναι, 
πώς δέ* καί έν ύποκειμένφ δλως τα συμπληρωτικό δυνατόν λέγεσθαι; ού γάρ  ή 
Σωκράτους μορφή έν ύποκειμένφ έστιν τω  Σωκράτει, όλλ' εΤπερ δρα, τό το ίς ήδη τελείοις 
έξωθεν έπεισιόντα, ταυτα δν ε’ιή έν ύποκειμένοις αύτοΐς*.
(2) τούτην δή τήν απορίαν λυων ό Πορφύριος 'δ ιττόν, φησίν, έστιν τό  
υποκείμενον, ού μόνου κατά τους άπό τής Στοάς, άλλα καί κατά τούς πρεσβυτέρους·. ή 
τε γάρ όποιος ‘ύλη, ήν δυνάμει καλεΐ ό ‘Αριστοτέλης, πρώτον έστιν τού ύποκειμένου 
σημαινόμενον, καί δεύτερον, ο κοινώς ποιόν ή ιδίως υφίσταται· ύποκείμενον γά ρ  καί ό 
χαλκός έστιν καί ό Σωκράτης τοΐς έπιγινομένοις ή κατηγορουμένοις κατ' σύτων. πολλά 
οδν, φησίν, τών έγγινομένων ώς μέν πρός τό πρώτον ύποκείμενον έν ύποκει μένω έστιν, 
οΤον πάυ χρώμα καί παν σχήμα καί πάσα ποιότης έν ύποκει μένη έστιν τή  πρώ τη υλη, 
ούχ ώς μέρη αύτής όντα καί άδύνατα χωρίς αύτής εΐναί· έπί δέ του δευτέρου 
υποκειμένου ου παν χρώμα ουδέ πάσα ποιότης έν ύποκειμένφ, άλλ’ όταν μή 
συμπληρωτικά! είσι τή ς  ούσίας. τό  γοϋν λευκόν έπί μέν τού έρίου έν ύποκειμένφ, έπί δέ 
τής χιόνος ούκ έν ύποκειμένφ, άλλα συμπληροί τήν ουσίαν ώς μέρος, καί υποκείμενον 
μάλλον έστιν κατά τήν ούσίαν. όμοίως δέ καί ή θερμότης τής μέν του πυρός ούσίας 
μέρος έστιν, έν ύποκειμένφ δέ γίνεται τω  σιδήρφ, έπειδή καί γίνεται καί απογίνεται έν 
τφ  σιδήρφ δνευ τής του σιδήρου φθοράς.
(3) ό τοίνυν Αριστοτέλης το  δεύτερον βηθέν ύποκείμενον ένταΰθα λαβών τό  κατά 
τό σύνθετον καί τήν δτομον ούσίαν, δπερ μήτε έν ύποκειμένφ εΐναί φησίν μήτε καθ' 
ύποκειμένου τινός λέγεσθαι, εικότως πάν τό  μή ούσιωδώς έπ' αύτοΰ λεγόμενον, άλλα 
κατά τό συμβεβηκέναι, έν ύποκειμένφ τούτφ  εΐναί φησίν, ώσπερ τήν θερμότητα έν τώ  
σιδήρφ* τό δέ συμπληρωτικά ώς την του πυρός θερμότητα του μέν πυρός μέρος αν 
εΤποι, εν ύποκειμένφ δέ τή  άποίφ  υλη\
